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Turning Worms: Some Thoughts on Liabilities for
Spreading Computer Infections 
Richard C. Owens†
(what does it really mean when we assess liability on theA Time of Plague 
basis of a ‘‘trespass’’ in cyberspace?) sometimes obscures
analysis.he Internet teems with malevolent computer codeT created with malice, from boredom or callous This article, then, is a brief speculation on liabilities
greed. Often classed with other invasive software as in Canada for the spread of viruses and worms. 6
‘‘malware’’, it comprises viruses, worms, Trojan horses,
spyware, and the like. 1 It is a rare computer that has not
suffered in one of the many recent epidemics — Win32,
A Steady Diet of Worms the sobig virus, the Slammer worm, beagle, and so on. 2
An infection gives rise, potentially, to many symptoms. s we are reminded in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, ‘‘your
One’s computer and address book may be used as a junk A worm is your only emperor for diet’’, 7 meaning that
electronic mail relay, 3 or as a spam generator in a denial the worm feasts equally on the low and the mighty. As
of service attack. 4 Perhaps computer operations will stop we look at the mounting financial carnage from com-
so a message will appear on the screen; perhaps all the puter worms, their omnivorousness is apparent.
data and programmes in the computer hard drives will
Damages arising from viruses and worms are uni-be deleted. Serious damages often ensue. Faced perhaps
versally estimated to be enormous. The SQL Slammerwith the remains of a trashed hard drive, a user might,
worm is said to have caused over US$1 billion inthen, overlook the fact that he or she has also been an
damage worldwide in 2002. 8 In 2001, the costs of theunwitting agent of the spread of a worm, which has
Code Red worm and Code Red II virus were estimatedhijacked his or her computer and address book to fulfil
at more than US$2 billion. A recent study suggests thatits vermian destiny, visiting havoc on his or her fellows.
damage from worms and viruses in the United States in
In such circumstances, it would be cruel indeed not 2003 exceeded US$55 billion. In 2001, a Price-
only to find a hard drive trashed, but to be sued for WaterhouseCoopers study estimated the annual global
damages arising from an unknowing role in the spread costs of malicious computer use at US$1.6 trillion. 9 Such
of a worm, to boot. Could it happen? The extent of figures are inherently unreliable, but certainly indicative
liability for an inadvertent role in turning a worm is of the order of magnitude of such harm. Recently, the
difficult to gauge. But the consequences of infections are Symantec Internet Security Threat report stated:
so serious and so widespread that it is only a matter of
In August 2003, the Win32.Blaster blended threat rapidlytime before this, and a plethora of other legal questions spread worldwide, and several other highly severe worms
arising from the proliferation of worms and viruses, followed. In only eight days the pace and frequency of these
threats created havoc for systems administrators as well ascome before the courts. 5
for PC home users, with an estimated cost of damages run-Two aspects of the virus/worm liability problem are ning up to $2 billion . . . some corporations were prepared
of particular note. The first is how tightly the Internet and not affected by these threats while others were unpre-
pared. 10binds together many possible defendants; those who
build and run it, those who populate it with increasingly The scope of the problem, and in particular, the
complex electronic commerce Web sites, those who pro- scale of damages in notable cases, can be hard to calcu-
vide terminal software, those who send electronic mails, late; worm attacks often go unreported because many
those who design its security algorithms, those who corporate victims do not want the existence of security
insure it, and those who hack it, amongst others. weaknesses known.11 According to one U.K. security
The second aspect is how speculative such a review researcher, viruses and worms targeting Microsoft sys-
is. Little case law pertains. Even the language of the law tems cost users $64.5 billion in productivity loss, hard-
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ware and software upgrades and data recovery in the puter to another by entering security holes. 16 This loner
third quarter of 2003 alone. 12 worm bypasses the user and infects his or her computer.
From there, the worm scans the Internet for other com-Far more such damage will certainly arise. It once
puters that also have a security hole through which it canwas difficult to create a virus or a worm, and it once
enter, and then infects those computers. 17required a significant effort to spread it to other com-
puters. Today, software applications that any user can use An example of a loner worm is the SQL Slammer
to create worms can be readily downloaded from the worm. The Slammer worm took advantage of a flaw in
Internet. These applications are easy to find and to use, Microsoft’s SQL Server software and used it as a means
and since a worm is self-propagating, the resulting cre- to enter computers, copy itself, and spread to other com-
ations are easily spread. In fact, in 2001, worms became puters. 18 The SQL Slammer worm infected over 120,000
the most widespread computer infections, surpassing computers throughout the world in January 2003, 19
macro and boot viruses. 13 interfering with bank machines, ISP operations, telecom-
Even the FBI has, apparently, risked incurring lia- munications, and many corporate networks. 20 A patch
bility for spreading viruses. In its magic lantern scheme, was issued by Microsoft six months prior to the spread of
the FBI itself planned to distribute a virus-like computer the SQL Slammer worm to fix the security hole that the
programme. This programme would have installed itself worm used to spread itself, yet many companies did not
on the computers of certain Internet subscribers targeted apply the patches to their IT networks. 21
for surveillance. It would have recorded, and reported to
In most respects, the rules for determining liabilitythe FBI, the click streams14 of the computer users, cir-
relating to damage for a virus will be like those for acumventing privacy enhancing technologies on the com-
worm. But viruses, and some worms, are activated whenputer. (These might include, for instance, encryption of
an attachment to electronic mail is opened. This adds anelectronic mail.) Since the complete click stream could
element of volition to their spread or, at least, a clearbe caught, it would have also provided access to a great
chance to avoid harm, which could be significant for adeal of other data entered into the computer. To dis-
determination of liability. In virtually all cases of infec-tribute this programme required the co-operation of
tion, a user could be alerted to the activity of the wormInternet Service Providers (‘‘ISP’’) and anti-virus software
or virus, regardless of whether he or she took a deliberatemakers, which in both cases was generally withheld,
step to bring it to life. Depending on the nature of theapparently because of their concern for ill effects on the
infection and the configuration and use of the software,computer systems of their customers, and the attendant
signs of unusual activity in the user’s computer might beliabilities of those effects. The reputational effects of
evident. For instance, if a central processing unit capacitybeing party to such an invasion of privacy could not have
monitor (an integral part of Microsoft Windows) wereeluded them either.
open and running, unusual activity not accounted for by
the user’s behaviour would be indicated. Slow response
times could be another tip-off. Ignoring such signs mightTaxonomy of Pests 
be described as reckless of the risk one’s infected com-Viruses and worms are computer programmes
puter posed or, indeed, negligent.designed to propagate and to perform certain behaviours
that are damaging to, and out of the control of the The vigilance of network administrators and
owner/operator of the computer that animates them. A software vendors means that various notices often
virus spreads itself by infecting — travelling on the back attend, or precede, the arrival of a worm or virus. By
of — a certain computer file or files, often a .exe file. A creating an opportunity to avoid harm, they can be
standard virus only spreads when an infected file is trans- expected to increase the risk of liability for those whose
ferred from one computer to another, and opened. A failure to heed them results in damages. There are per-
worm, on the other hand, does not infect a specific file, haps, broadly speaking, two sorts of such warnings, and
and it sends itself from one computer to another without they are not always as clear or as prompt as they might
needing to ride in a particular file. 15 The biological meta- be. In the first, a software maker, alerted by normal
phors ‘‘virus’’ and ‘‘worm’’ are apposite; given in partic- maintenance activity or by an alert user, detects a flaw in
ular a true virus’s ambiguous status as an independent the software’s security structure. A warning is provided
life form, it is unable to propagate without a cellular and a patch prepared. Such warnings might be sent by
host. Worms are clearly parasitic, but autonomous. electronic mail to systems administrators, and would in
Computer worms fall broadly into two categories, any event be posted on a Web site. But such alerts are
differing in the way that they spread from one computer issued frequently. Which ones merit quick action? How
to another. A co-dependent (or mass-mailer) worm often ought a responsible user visit the Web site to
enters a computer by hiding in an e-mail attachment. search for such warnings? The second type of warning is
Once the user opens the infected e-mail attachment, the that a particular worm or virus is on the move. This
worm infects the computer, and then e-mails itself to warning typically arrives in one’s mailbox sometime after
everyone in the computer’s e-mail address book. A net- the worm itself, presumably attenuating the warning’s
work-aware (or loner) worm spreads itself from one com- legal effect.
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Even if a warning were received, however, there proof that a particular patch was available, known, and
might be reason not to heed it. For reasons discussed perhaps whether its installation could have been
below, a user might reasonably consider whether the risk expected to be reasonably convenient and non-disrup-
of installing the software patch proffered as a solution to tive in relation to the harm it might potentially avoid.
the identified security risk is itself a greater risk than the And, to make matters still more ambiguous, now some
uncertain threat of an infection. worms themselves arrive disguised as patches.
With respect to complex platforms, especially enter-
prise networks, patches pose problems magnified by the
Digital Hygiene scale of the enterprise. Security patches might interfere
with the operation of complex systems that combine a
Patches number of software packages, so administrators may rea-
sonably decide not to install certain patches some of theperating systems, browsers, and other software can time. Furthermore, the patches themselves can be buggy.O provide an unwitting welcome to a virus or worm.
Keeping up with the patch stream for one’s businessIndeed, the intervals grow ever shorter between the dis-
software is an increasing productivity drain. It meanstribution of a software version with such a weakness, and
taking down Web sites and other applications thatits discovery and exploitation by worm breeders. 22 A
owners want operational all the time. It means redi-flaw might be a coding error that left a hole for an
recting scarce resources to unpredictable maintenanceinfection. Alternately, it could arise from a deliberate
requirements. In many enterprises, solving the problem‘‘back door’’ left in a software release when it was distrib-
means the tedious work of installing the patch and re-uted. This might have been done to permit maintenance
booting not a few but thousands of individual serversaccess, to permit use to be cut off in the event of failure
and personal computers, each with its own copies ofto pay licence fees (a tactic of dubious legality), or for
vulnerable systems. 23 Yet to maintain a computer net-other, more sinister reasons. Presumably, leaving an
work open to the Internet and not to patch promptly,undisclosed back door that promotes an infection could
and thereby provide a weak node in which to breedincrease the chance of licensor liability — and could
worms and provide the central processing unit (‘‘CPU’’)undermine the efficacy of contractual exclusions from
cycles to propel them on their cyberspace journey, mightliability.
be regarded as unneighbourly, or even negligent.A security flaw might not result from a true error. It
might simply reflect a small and temporary deficit in a
responsible programming team’s approach to the Anti-Virus Software 
unending ‘‘arm’s race’’ between software companies and
Symantec Corporation (‘‘Symantec’’) and McAfeehackers. Again, the nature of the flaw can be expected to
(part of Network Associates, Inc.) are software manufac-influence a finding of negligence or breach of warranty.
turers who are among the leading distributors of virusEither negligent work or a deliberate back door justify
protection software. Such software relies on filters thatliability. Security weaknesses commensurate with
scan network traffic and local memory and storage forindustry best practices (however deficient such practices
the presence of worms. The ability to recognise a wormmight seem, in hindsight) do not.
is dependent on whether the software is able to match
Flaws in software might or might not matter in invading code to a reference point in an up-to-date
terms of security; many bugs have no such implication. library of worms on the same computer; to have an up-
As security flaws (and other bugs) are discovered in to-date library obliges the user to download updates
software with an installed base of customers, repair code from the applicable Web site regularly. To fail to update
is developed and made available on the licensor’s Web the library is to avoid an opportunity to prevent infec-
site. These individual repairs are called ‘‘patches’’. It is up tion. Often, such updates occur automatically and regu-
to the user to access and install the patches, or not. Some larly, giving rise to the question of when a ‘‘special’’
software includes the ability to automatically access update is an obligation because of potential risk.
updates and patches; in fact, this is increasingly the case. Whether not acquiring any such update is part of a given
For a user to avail himself or herself of this automatic standard of care will depend on the sophistication of the
update facility, he or she must have registered with the user and the extent, nature, and duration of publicity
distributor of the software. Additionally, the user must and warnings about the damaging bug.
not interfere with the preferences settings that allow the
Symantec’s Web site tells us just how intense theservice to run or, if they are not on as a default when
war against computer bugs is. Describing its efforts,installed, activate them. If a dialogue box requests confir-
Symantec reports:mation to run the update routine and, afterward, to
With over 20,000 sensors monitoring network activity inrestart the computer to allow the updates to take effect,
over 180 countries, Symantec has established one of theconsent must be given.
most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the
Whether or not a duty of care existed to avoid world, giving Symantec’s analysts a superior source of attack
infection by the installation of a patch will depend upon data from which to spot important trends. 24
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the terms of the licences governing the installed softwareTainted Meat 
has been that of a notice wrapped around and fastenedSpam, or junk e-mail, is an acknowledged public
to the computer’s keyboard, preventing the computer’spolicy problem.25 As we will see later in this paper, it is a
use without first seeing and removing it. Sometimes thegrowing source of the proliferation of worms. The
notice of a license is put on the shipping box. In anycommon occurrence of receiving e-mail from strangers
event, the problem is the same — ensuring both that thealso helps worms to intrude. Thus, spam filters might
consumer is aware that he or she is entering into aalso prove a useful anti-worm weapon.
relationship with a different business in respect of the
software components of his or her purchase, and that his
or her use of those components is governed by its ownUnsafe Computing: of Quarantine set of terms. These terms, in the normal course, would
and Carriers provide for exclusions of certain types of liabilities; if the
drafter of them were sufficiently adept, it might include
losses owing to invasions of worms and attendant liabili-Potential Defendants 
ties to third parties.
ho might be liable for worm infestations? Poten-
In addition to the foregoing, the list of potentialW tial defendants would vary with the circum-
defendants for an action arising out of an infection isstances of the infection, 26 but they would certainly
long. They include:include the worm’s author, and anyone who modified it
● anti-virus software manufacturers;or used it to launch an attack. 27 Hardware manufacturers
would generally seem to be relatively remote from lia- ● the proprietor of an electronic commerce Web
bility. Firewalls, which are generally software barriers to site, whose customer base becomes prey to a
intrusion, are sometimes hardware-based. Where such a worm, resulting in further spreading of the
solution is implemented and proved faulty, liability worm and breaches of privacy;
would seem more likely.
● a consultant, systems integrator, distributor,
Vulnerabilities to worms are primarily a problem retailer, or other vendor who recommended or
for computer operating systems. Other software, such as provided vulnerable technology, particularly in
databases and e-mail systems, helps to spread viruses and the case of a holding out of a special capacity to
worms. The liability of hardware manufacturers, there- deal with security issues;
fore, would seem most likely to arise from the software
● consultants hired to assess security or fix vulner-they choose to bundle with their products. Such liability, abilities;however, might be avoided because they succeeded in
● security auditors;making clear to the plaintiff at the time of purchase that
the software manufacturer, and not the hardware manu- ● a provider of managed security services;
facturer, entered into the supply relationship with the
● an application service provider;
plaintiff.
● an outsourcing vendor with responsibility for an
Hardware supplier responsibility could also be electronic commerce Web site, applications
denied based on an issue of causation. If an operating software, or computer desktop management;
system chosen resulted in harm from a worm because of and
vulnerabilities, how could a hardware manufacturer have
● an Internet service provider. 28avoided that harm? Perhaps Microsoft Windows is
known to be a popular target for viruses, but how can
software manufacturers not bundle it? It is not as though, Contractual Defences 
after all, many alternative operating systems that would The liability of any party would vary with the
be immune present themselves as practical alternatives, nature, and enforceability, of contractual terms. Particu-
and are acceptable to the consumer. Liability might be larly relevant provisions would include limitations of lia-
less likely to arise, therefore, on the theory that a poor bility, limitations of damages, waivers of implied warran-
product was chosen and supplied, than on a failure of a ties, limitations of warranties, and the like. Such defences
duty to warn, which is discussed further, below. will benefit the service provider and licensor. Needless to
Whether a customer realizes that a third party sup- say, infections (like human varieties) do not spread only
plied bundled software is an issue that will test the tech- among relationships of contractual privity or other close
niques used to bring software licences, and their relationships. Their independent spread across a network
attendant liability restrictions, to the customer’s atten- will result in damage arising from one network node in
tion when a computer is purchased. Perhaps such a test another that is entirely unknown. Often there will be no
will come up in the context of a class action suit by contractually based defences that would apply between
purchasers who failed to notice the ribbon around their infecter and infectee. Infection by a stranger, however,
keyboards, for instance. Amongst the numerous tech- might implicate other contractual relationships. For
niques to bring to the attention of computer purchasers instance, a Web site that collected names and electronic
Turning Worms: Some Thoughts on Liabilities for Spreading Computer Infections 37
mail addresses from clients might be able to argue that Steps to mitigate the effect of worms are being
the terms of its Web wrap or other form of agreement taken by ISPs. They are beginning to actively seek out
with them would apply to limit damages arising from customers whose computers have been turned into
the propagation of worms to the e-mail list. ‘‘zombies’’ — that is, spam relayers — where the volumes
of messages spike. Customers are contacted or cut off. It
should be noted, though, that false results can arise from
Liability of Individuals mail system responses to hacker probes. Also, working
groups of ISPs have been organized to share informationWhile many of those particular defendants encom-
on spam and worm attacks. 31 To engage in such proac-passed by the list above will prove to be corporate enti-
tive oversight could enhance the risk of liability, as it hasties, the potential for individual liability also arises. In
with respect to liability for libellous content on theirsome cases, some of those described above will not have
servers. 32been part of a corporation. Even if they were, individuals
will be directly responsible, at some level, for the causes Radin has argued33 that liability will converge on
of the damage, even if they are doing so in the name of a ISPs as technology to detect and quarantine virus-laden
corporation. Given the trend to relax the requirements of traffic becomes available, making them the least cost
contractual privity to allow employees to shelter behind avoider of harm. However, it is far from clear that adding
contractual limitations of liability favouring their and maintaining such a layer of costly security, with its
employers, 29 individual coders or posters of patches, net- potential for disruptions, mistakenly seized e-mails, and
work administrators, or any number of other individuals the like, would truly be ‘‘least cost’’. Even if it were
in the world of network and software services and main- installed, it is unlikely to be perfect. The remaining
tenance will probably be safe from damages occasioned potential for failure would result in high levels of redun-
by them in the course of their work (assuming that their dancy, as users would rationally continue to install their
employers negotiated adequate and enforceable contrac- own anti-virus protection. This might defeat societal cost
tual limitations of liability in the first place). Needless to savings. There could also be the risk of a false detection
say, while an individual would probably benefit from resulting in intercepted, uninfected mail, or delayed
contractual exclusions of liability, except in circum- deliveries. Failure to update the software firewall could
stances of fraud or undisclosed agency, he or she would create a basis for a negligence claim. It has also been
not be liable for performance of the contract. He or she suggested that ISPs might have a duty to warn of the
would not be subject to liabilities for covenants or war- risks of contamination attendant on the use of their
ranties contractually imposed in the inter-corporate services, particularly high bandwidth. 34 Finally, it is a
transaction. This is not the case for his or her individual difficult context in which to try to pin down who the
liability in tort, however, where the foreseeability of least cost avoider is, for such a determination will always,
harm could result in personal liability. at least, be contingent on the selection of particular tech-
nologies available at any given time. We must be carefulIndividual investors who have involved themselves
not to constrain the inventiveness that will produce thatwith a software firm through a partnership structure so
selection by limiting incentives with premature choicesas to take direct advantage of tax losses could be in for
of liability rules.nasty surprises as direct owners, and therefore licensors,
of computer software. Again, they would benefit from In the case of copyright infringement, ISPs, as tele-
the terms of the licence (and, in any event, such struc- communications services providers, are held harmless for
tures have been out of vogue for some time, not least for merely providing facilities over which infringing content
reasons of potential liability). is communicated. Perhaps a case exists for similar protec-
tion to be extended to operating general applicationNeedless to say, a corporate veil will not shield a
worm protection facilities.hacker from criminal liability.
Liability of ISPs 
By virtue of their position, ISPs are in a position to Theories of Liability 
become aware of the risks of a worm, and the increased
traffic and effects on Internet operation, earlier than end
users. In the right situation, perhaps they could prevent Criminal Liability damage by shutting down their servers, or by filtering
out messages that appear wormy or virus-bearing. Yet, he Criminal Code (Canada)35 does not specifically
the principle of the Internet is end-to-end neutrality. The T address the propagation of worms and viruses.
Internet community does not expect its messages to be Criminal liability pertaining to certain abuses of com-
legitimately intercepted or snooped; indeed, absent a puters is dealt with in sections 342.1 and 342.2, and
grant of permission under the customer agreement, sec- subsections 430(1.1) and (5.1). Depending on the precise
tion 342.1 of the Criminal Code (Canada)30 would pre- circumstances of the attack and its consequences, one of
sumably apply. these provisions could apply.
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Section 342.1 deals with the offence of ‘‘Unautho- other, more sophisticated electrical acoustic devices
rized use of Computer’’. Subsection 342.1(1) states that: (‘‘blue boxes’’), which circumvent security systems to pro-
vide access to systems without permission. But it is no(1) Every one who, fraudulently and without colour of right,
stretch to extend the section to apply to the author of a(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service,
worm, to an individual in possession of the worm, or at(b) by means of an electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechan-
least to the worm and a computer capable of launchingical or other device, intercepts or causes to be inter-
cepted, directly or indirectly, any function of a com- it.
puter system,
Subsection 430(1.1) of the Criminal Code deals
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a with mischief to data:computer system with intent to commit an offence
430(1.1) Every one commits mischief who willfullyunder paragraph (a) or (b) or an offence under sec-
tion 430 in relation to data or a computer system, (a) destroys or alters data;
or
(b) renders data meaningless, useless or ineffective;(d) uses, possesses, traffics in or permits another person
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawfulto have access to a computer password that would
use of data; orenable a person to commit an offence under para-
graph (a), (b) or (c) (d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment in the lawful use of data or denies access to data to
for a term not exceeding ten years, or is guilty of an offence any person who is entitled to access thereto.
punishable on summary conviction. A person convicted of this offence could be sentenced for up
to five years in prison, or found guilty upon summary con-This section is directed at hacking into computer
viction and subjected to a lesser sentence. 39systems without authorization or payment, but its
expansive language could apply to the author of a virus Again, this section was not intended to deal with
or worm attack. worms and viruses, but to set loose a worm or virus
could often result in liability under it. If the worm didParagraph 342.1(1)(a) would almost always apply to
not actually destroy or alter data, however, para-an infection by a worm. The worm diverts the operation
graph 430(1.1)(a) would not apply (although the attemptof the computer to the purposes of the worm and its
provisions of the Criminal Code would, depending onauthor. In some cases, the result might not be very con-
design of the virus). But the slowing of computer opera-structive, even from the author’s perspective, leading one
tion, or its unresponsiveness, frequent results of worms,to quibble whether the worm-triggered computer
could be obstructions or interruptions in the lawful useresponse was, indeed, a ‘‘service’’. But since that response
of data described in paragraphs (c) and (d).is intended by the author, it would hardly lie in his or
her mouth to disclaim that he or she valued it to any Based on the foregoing, then, it is likely that the
extent as a service. It would obviously apply, in partic- actus reus of an offence could be made out in the case of
ular, to the use of a Trojan horse borne by a worm to a worm attack. Criminal liability depends also on proof
commandeer CPU cycles. Or, consider the Code Red of intent. While it would apply to the hacker creator of
virus, which gave the attacker ‘‘complete administrator malicious code, it would not to the unwitting provider of
access to systems, which means it had the potential to the equipment, networks, or computing power used to
plunder data, delete files and destroy systems’’. 36 Viruses disseminate worms. 40
used to take over a computer to propagate spam would Other criminal liability might attach, depending onappear to fall clearly within the intent of the section. the means of worm delivery. Examples such as the recent
Since paragraph 342.1(1)(a) so clearly applies, it is virus purporting itself to be a patch from Microsoft
not troubling that paragraph (b) is slightly more prob- might qualify as a forgery under section 366 of the Crim-
lematical. While a worm is almost certainly a device (or, inal Code. So, too, might the offence of fraud, under
if not, the combination of the worm and the computer section 380, be made out.
that launched it would be), it is less clear that a virus in
The difficulty of tracing the origin of worms, andmany circumstances can be said to ‘‘intercept’’ a func-
the great cost of doing so, bring into question the efficacytion. Paragraph (c) would apply, since the author’s com-
of criminal deterrence as a solution to the wormputer system would have been used at least with the
problem. As one commentator put itintent of committing an offence under paragraph (a).
Although nearly 63,000 viruses have rolled through theUnder section 342.2, ‘‘Possession of Device to Internet, causing an estimated $65 billion (U.S.) in damage,
Obtain Computer Service’’, the manufacture, possession, criminal prosecutions have been few, penalties light and just
sale, or offer to sell any instrument, device or component a handful of people have gone to prison . . . One person has
been sent to prison in the United States and just two inunder circumstances that could create a reasonable infer-
Britain . . . 41ence that it was intended to be used to commit an
offence under section 342.1 is illegal, and could result in The absence of credible criminal enforcement is
two years’ imprisonment, or a finding of guilty of a sum- obviously a problem. To remedy this, Microsoft recently
mary conviction offence. 37 Again, the section is directed set aside US$5 million to fund rewards for worm
at devices, like the famous Captain Crunch whistle38 or authors. 42
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Virtually every ISP and software licensor will haveContractual and Quasi-Contractual
contractual exclusions of liability in place that, presum-Liability 
ably, will apply to worm and virus damage. It is, however,
Various warranties, covenants, or representations — worth noting that such contractual terms are strictly con-
by software licensor to licensee, outsourcer to client, ISP strued, which could limit their application if it is ambig-
to client, etc. — could be breached by a worm attack, or uous in respect to the infection in question. Moreover,
by attendant service or system failures. Such terms would generic — and non-negotiated — disclaimers may not
usually be found in a written (or electronic) contract, but be legally enforceable in all jurisdictions. 48
might also be collateral. 43
Common contractual terms that could be breached Indeed, in theory, system users might not only be
include: unable themselves to collect from service or software
providers for the damages they have suffered because of● warranties relating to the performance of
contractual exclusions, but standard terms could makesoftware designed to enhance system security, or
them liable to online services they infect. ANZ Bank’sto the expertise of those providing security-
standard online banking terms got them in hot waterrelated services;
when it was noticed that they made customers contrac-
● covenants in an outsourcing contract to main- tually liable for passing on viruses. 49 Such terms are not
tain the currency of software versions, or of hard- unusual. They are also, arguably, not advisable. No bank
ware and software in use, where a prompt is likely to sue a customer for failed operations (except
change would have corrected a vulnerability; 44 where such failure was the result of a deliberate act); why
provoke them with such a clause? The clause might● covenants in an outsourcing contract directed
succeed on the principles of contract law. But if it did, itmore generally to ensuring continual adoption
would produce a situation that practically begged forof best available technologies; 45
legislation to overrule it.
● covenants to maintain online disaster recovery
servers, where such servers themselves fell prey Unless effectively excluded by contract, provincialto the infection and so become unavailable; sales of goods legislation could affect liability for
● up time covenants by Web hosts or outsourcing breaching warranties or conditions of sale, particularly
service providers; the warranty of fitness for the purpose intended by the
purchaser, or the condition of merchantability, for selling
● overarching standard of performance covenants products that contained latent defects. 50 Typically, how-(i.e., ‘‘outsourcer will in all circumstances per- ever, any terms of sales of goods legislation that mightform in accordance with the highest industry apply are excluded by the terms of the software licence.standards . . .’’); In any event, sales of goods legislation may not apply to
● security standards specified by or to system inte- software alone, since software is an intangible (although
grators; and packaged software is a ‘‘good’’ for Ontario Retail Sales
Tax purposes). Thus, a claim against a software vendor
● privacy policies of Web sites (a form of Web
based on sales and goods legislation may fail. On thewrap, to the extent that reliance can be said to
other hand, a claim against a hardware vendor, perhapshave been induced). 46
relating to a bundle of hardware and software, might
There will certainly be others. Rest assured that succeed. Section 15 of the Ontario Sale of Goods Act
imaginative counsel will visit afresh outstanding infor- (‘‘SGA’’) 51 states that if the buyer has notified the seller of
mation technology and Internet contracts with the same the expressed or implied purpose for which he plans to
eye to vulnerability that the hacker displayed in use the goods, there is an implied condition that the
attacking the computer system. Both law and code, after goods sold by the seller are reasonably fit for that
all, are systems of risk management, and all systems are expressed or implied purpose. 52
vulnerable to some degree. In this context, the clever
litigator is not unlike the clever hacker. And the solicitor The implied conditions and warranties of the SGA
who designs protection for his or her clients is at the can be contracted out of through an express agreement
peril of an unknowable future. between the parties, 53 except in consumer sales. 54
Any claims that the manufacturer or developer
made about the resistance of its hardware or software to It is an inherent characteristic of the spread of
infection that were found to be incorrect could be con- worms that large groups of people are affected. The
sidered negligent misrepresentations that could make Korean litigation (described in footnote 5) is a good
the manufacturer or developer liable to the licensee of example of the large classes of potential defendants. A
the software, whether or not such representations gap in contractual protections, perhaps by the applica-
formed a part of the contractual terms relating to the tion of the SGA, could provide the foundation for a class
provision of the software. 47 action.
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Tort Nuisance 
It is also possible that nuisance law could be
extended to provide a cause of action for the effects ofIntentional Torts 
worms. If nuisance provides a remedy for annoying tele-
The FBI’s Magic lantern worm, mentioned above, is phone calls, 60 why not for other nuisance communica-
a reminder that worms are spread for a variety of rea- tions?
sons: simple destruction, for political or ideological rea-
sons, 55 for surveillance, or, in the case of the propagation
of spam, for commercial gain. 56 Recently, Trojans have
Negligence been installed in computers to enable access to online
bank accounts to facilitate unauthorized withdrawals. 57 Any number of situations of vermian damage could
While the existence of intent will be important to prove give rise to claims of negligence. To succeed, a plaintiff
certain offences and torts, the nature of the intent, in the must prove that the defendant had a duty of care to the
case of civil liability, should not be. If a computer crashes, plaintiff; that that duty was breached by failing to exer-
or data are destroyed, compensation for the loss should cise the appropriate level of care, causing the injury com-
not be diminished if the intention were to intrude with plained of; and that the plaintiff suffered actual loss or
fewer ill effects. damage. 61
The challenging case for intention is one where the
authorship of the worm is not in doubt, but its escape is
proved to be accidental. Perhaps, then, liability would Duty of Care 
flow from analogy to release of noxious substances. A duty is owed to all those whom one ought reason-
ably to foresee would be affected by one’s actions. 62 The
Supreme Court of Canada has established a test forTrespass 
determining if a duty of care existed between two parties
In Canada, no case has yet found liability for inten- in private law.63 The first stage of the two-stage test is
tionally infecting a computer with a virus. It is undoubt- used to determine if the relationship between the parties
edly an actionable wrong, but the exact nature of lia- was sufficiently proximate that carelessness by one
bility awaits elucidation. In the United States, the would damage the other. If a proximate relationship
doctrine of trespass to chattels has been used to find that exists between them, the test permits the court to limit
Web sites that experienced reduced bandwidth capacity or negate the scope of the duty, the class of persons to
through receiving spam or being subjected to unwanted whom it is owed, or the damages that arise from the
data-gathering programs suffered property damage that breach, 64 based upon policy considerations. 65 Thus, in
could be recoverable in tort, specifically the tort of tres- Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst and Young,66 the
pass to chattels. 58 While the idea that causing a worm duty of an auditor was circumscribed, to avoid the risk of
infection is a form of trespass has the attraction of super- indeterminate liability for a negligent statement in a
ficial analogy — it is, after all, to put someone else’s crea- financial report that may have been put to use for pur-
tion in a forbidden place — it is a novel interpretation of poses other than the original purpose for which it was
the law. Opinions vary on whether a court could stretch intended.67
trespass doctrine in Canada to provide redress for worm
An auditor is a paradigmatic example of one who, ifinfections. Indeed, the trend of academic opinion in the
negligent, could fall prey to an unpredictably andU.S. seems to resist this application of trespass law.59 An
unmanageably large number of lawsuits. This couldadvantage of this legal theory, however, is that it helps
make the position of auditor untenable; hence, the needavoid the problem of pure economic loss, described
to limit auditors’ exposure one way or another. Similarbelow.
considerations must limit liability for negligently
allowing the propagation of a virus or a worm over the
Internet, however the policy is expressed.Misrepresentation 
Another intentional tort that might come into play The first stage of this test is difficult when dealing
for distribution of malicious code is misrepresentation. with damage caused by network proximity, and it there-
To make a false representation that systems were secure fore compels careful consideration of the test. On the
against intrusion could expose one to tort liability for Internet, everyone is your neighbour — millions and
someone who relied on it, whether or not there was a millions of entities with separate title to terminal facili-
contract. The representation would have to be made to ties, each of whom is a potential plaintiff (or defendant).
the victim or reasonably foreseeably heard and acted on And, since the travel of worm packets is unpredictable,
by the victim. Similarly, since worms and viruses often someone in Chad or Mongolia is as proximate a neigh-
arise in electronic mails, which disguise their contents, bour as someone down the street. In the case of the
perhaps an action for fraudulent misrepresentation author of the damage, we are surely content to let him or
would lie against the author. her find his or her legal peril, wherever his or her mis-
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deed leads him or her. For an individual user, potentially arising from the unknowable path of a worm is not a
culpable only for negligence, if at all, such open-ended likely case.
liability is unjust. Assuming that it were possible to trace Enterprises could also be vicariously liable for the
the path of a particular infection to its immediate source, actions of their employees, such as the deliberate for-
a defendant would be exposed to a sort of lottery of warding of an infected joke, e-mail, or movie clip. Such
mischance. Can your unhygienic computer be shown to activity might or might not qualify. It would often
have passed the problem only to the neighbour’s child’s breach explicit employer guidelines, but it would be a
computer, or also to the U.S. and Russian governments? use of an employer system during business hours. The
Did it unwittingly pass on a bit of code that causes a negligent conduct of a systems administrator could
brief notice requesting a moment of silence on Remem- make his or her employer liable through vicarious lia-
brance Day to appear, or one that shuts down a national bility. Employers are vicariously liable in two situations:
economy? Faced with such a hazard, it is difficult to (1) for employee acts that are authorized by the employer, or
describe the scope of a duty to other users. Thus, (2) unauthorized acts so connected with authorized acts that
whether for considerations of proximity or policy, we they may be regarded as modes (albeit improper modes) of
doing an authorized act. 74would expect courts would rarely find a duty of care
where one is a careless node in the propagation of a
worm.
Standards of Care 
A similar policy calculation would hold for the
At any given time, the actions required to meet amanufacturer or developer of vulnerable software pro-
standard of care for protection from spreading wormsvoking the creation of a particular worm, and helping it
will depend on the particular risks of the day and theto spread. That manufacturer would have a duty to the
technologies available to meet them. The expected stan-parties whom it ought to reasonably foresee would be
dard of care to avoid spreading a worm or virus will alsoaffected by defects in its products. This would include
vary with the identity of the defendant. It will be higherimmediate clients, and those in contact with the clients.
for a professional IT consultant than for a personal com-The entire installed base could be affected (creating, pre-
puter user, higher where legislation sets specific stan-sumably, a good basis for a class action). Third parties
dards, such as where the requirements for security ofwho might have benefited had the software performed
data in the Protection of Personal Information and Elec-to promise, but who had not themselves purchased the
tronic Documents Act75 apply, or where levels of ITsoftware, are unlikely to be able to sustain a claim of
security and robustness are the subject of regulatoryduty owed to them by the manufacturer. Indeed, were
oversight, as in the case of financial institutions. 76 Wherethey able to, they would almost certainly be in a better
damage from a worm arose because of a breach of aposition than the licensee, since rights would be limited
statutory standard of care, civil liability might be basedby the licence to which it had agreed.
on the statutory breach.
Also, damages from worms would be principally There are several IT security organizations, such aseconomic, recovery for which is limited under Canadian CERT77 and SANS,78 who have suggested measures thatlaw.68 There are many reasons for this, including the IT professionals should take to better safeguard theprevention of indeterminate liability, and the duplica- Internet. 79 The European Union is also setting up thetion of lawsuits that would be launched under contract European Network and Information Security Agency,law.69 However, Canadian National Railway v. Norsk expected to be operational early in 2004. 80 CERT alsoPacific Steamship70 has established that in Canadian law, has guidelines for the disclosure of known vulnerabili-there can be recovery for economic loss if there is a ties. 81 Also significant is the International Organizationsufficient proximity between the negligent act and the for Standardization standard ISO/IEC 1799:2000 Infor-loss (along with the usual requirements of the presence mation technology — Code of practice for informationof a breach of duty and foreseeability of the loss). 71 The security management. 82 But there is no agreed standard,test established in Cooper v. Hobart72 is used to deter- nor any body governing the profession to set one. Themine if a sufficiently proximate relationship exists publications of CERT or SANS or ISO will have somebetween the parties, and if any policy considerations persuasive power, but no more, unless the defendant hasshould limit or negate the scope of the duty or damages made an explicit commitment to a particular standard.awarded. Recovery for economic losses under tort law Such a commitment can be useful for marketing pur-can occur if the plaintiff can establish that his or her poses (such as boasting of ISO 9001 quality control certi-losses arose from the defendant’s tortious act, were fore- fication), and is often made. Another body with a man-seeable, and sufficient proximity existed between the date including protection of computer infrastructure isparties. the Office for Critical Infrastructure Preparedness
Recovery of purely economic losses is confined to (‘‘OCIPEP’’), which has a programme of evaluating and
limited categories of relationship. 73 While courts can be providing warnings about information technology
expected to add to the existing categories in appropriate security failings. OCIPEP also helps to certify security
cases, the prospect of huge and unforeseeable losses worthiness of technologies. 83 OCIPEP’s mandate, how-
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ever, is far broader than information technology (its Web Contributory Negligence 
site, for instance, contains a grimly fascinating database Contributory negligence may result in the appor-
of Canadian natural disasters). tionment of liability amongst several of the potential
In computer services outsourcing contracts and defendants listed above. Foreseeability of harm to oneself
other services contracts, service providers will sometimes through one’s actions is the key component for contribu-
agree to overall standard of service covenants. Such a tory negligence. 86 If the downstream party did not take
covenant might, for instance, promise standards of ser- reasonable measures to prevent viral infections, then it
vice in accordance with the best professional standards may be at least partly liable under contributory negli-
of the industry. Such a covenant would help to resolve gence for the damages that it incurred.
any ambiguity in determining appropriate behaviours.
The standard of care for the maker of anti-virus Other Statutory Liabilities in Tort 
software is complex. There is no guarantee that effective
Viruses and worm infections could lead to breachesanti-virus software is always possible — that the coding
of statutory duties.power of the good guys is always stronger than that of
With enough warning of a security risk, a softwarethe bad guys. Even when a solution is possible, the time-
manufacturer might be in the possession of a materialliness of its delivery must be subject to reasonable limits.
fact as defined under applicable securities legislation,Discussion in security circles is full of talk of liability
requiring timely disclosure to the regulators and thefor spreading viruses. Such discussion began when dis-
markets. Failure to do so might result in expensive share-kettes were used, long before it was assumed such viruses
holder litigation. But whether or not it is a material factwould travel over the Internet. This is bound to be useful
depends to an extent on one’s assumptions about poten-to a plaintiff’s counsel proving standard of care. Thanks
tial liability. It can also depend on one’s business; a bugto the Internet, such discussion is now well documented
can be good for business, too, if your business is repairand easily accessible. In any event, given the scale of the
and data recovery.problem and its topicality, it would be a rare case indeed
Canada’s federal privacy law, like its financial ser-in which ignorance could be successfully argued.
vices legislation, contains obligations of data security, and
obligations of confidentiality. 87 However, the legislationCausation 
contains its own remedial mechanisms. Whether the
Worms fast become ubiquitous on the Internet. For Act’s rules give private parties any rights to bring their
every attack, one might receive several copies of an infec- own action has not yet been determined, although in the
tion. At the height of the transmission of an infection by case of Englander v. Telus, 88 an application was heard to
electronic mail, it has been estimated that a significant grant relief following the Privacy Commissioner’s failure
portion of all e-mail, exceeding 10%, is infected. Even if to do so (the application was rejected). Other duties,
there were a duty in a particular case, such as a duty to regulatory, statutory, or at common law, can also apply to
warn, it is not clear that a particular infection is the result certain types of information, such as financial and health-
of its breach. Any solution — a warning, a patch, the care-related data. The Bank Act (Canada) also contains
addition to the database of anti-virus software, might not certain data security and IT operation requirements; in
be timely, or might not be effective. It has, in fact, been some cases, it imposes the obligation directly on the
argued that due to delays in installing patches, bank’s board of directors. 89 In an instance in which
announcing a security failing might be of greater service directors approved confidentiality guidelines inadequate
to those who would exploit it than to those who should for their purpose, perhaps an action against them could
fill the breach. result. It would appear to be difficult for a director to
The determination of causation is also frustrated by argue that viruses and worms ought not to be contem-
the difficulty of tracing the origin of a virus. Many viruses plated as risks to confidentiality of data. Again, such
are polymorphic, which means that they contain muta- potential liability would only be invoked in a limited
tion engines that change their encryption routines each subset of hacker attack, one in which confidential data
time they are passed on to a new computer. 84 Therefore, were disclosed.
the virus that infected the upstream computer may have
been in a form that was not recognizable by its anti-viral
Product Liability protection measures. Thus, even if reasonable measures
were taken, it could have mutated into a different form Liability for failure to warn has been imposed on
that was recognizable by standard anti-viral precautions manufacturers and suppliers of dangerous products.
by the time it moved downstream. This would create They are required to warn all those who may reasonably
significant evidentiary problems in a negligence lawsuit. be affected by potentially dangerous products 90
The virus would have been detectable at the down- (including parties who are not party to the contract of
stream computer but not at the upstream one — making sale). 91 It is unlikely, however, that this obligation could
it hard to impose liability on the upstream computer, or extend to products causing risks of service disruption or
to gauge what standard of care should have applied. 85 risks to data, since that is not truly ‘‘dangerous’’ as con-
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templated by that duty. This would not be the case, come to determine the structure of the code as well, the
however, if the machine at risk had a life-saving function, author’s rights to prevent copying would be expected to
like a radiation therapy device or an ambulance dispatch be limited.
service, or controlled a dangerous process such as in a Ironically, since viruses are often written for non-
nuclear reactor or chemical plant. However, one would commercial reasons, they might have a better claim than
hope that such devices would be thoroughly isolated the average software for moral rights. Worms are usually
from contact with the Internet and any other foreseeable designed to convey political messages of one kind or
sources of worms. another, and shutting down the SCO or Microsoft Web
For the duty to warn to apply, the potential user sites, while unquestionably criminal, might be just such
must be reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer or an instance that merits moral rights protection, in theory.
supplier; ‘‘[however,] manufacturers and suppliers do not It is, however, unlikely to expect much judicial deference
have the duty to warn the entire world about every to such rights.
danger that can result from improper use of their
product.’’ 92 Networked computer products would not Insurance become ‘‘defective’’ — that is to say, use-impaired by
Insurance companies play a role in establishing stan-reason of infection — without the intervention of the
dards of care, since the ability to get insurance for infec-worm. Indeed, in some sense, the device ceases to be the
tions is conditional on having adequate anti-viral mea-manufacturer’s ‘‘product’’, since the sole characteristic
sures in place. 94 A limited number of insurers offermaking it dangerous is created by a third party. But this
coverage for e-business and its attendant liabilities,might not prove to be an impermeable defence. A com-
although such coverage appears currently to be limitedputer infection is not like a rider-mower souped up for
and expensive. 95 Insurers, including AIG96 and Zurich97racing. In the mower case, the owner of an isolated
offer coverage for a wide range of electronic business-product has used it as the basis for a different, more
related interruptions, including liabilities relating to for-dangerous thing; it is his or her responsibility and initia-
warding a virus or worm. Presumably, risk managers willtive. Viruses and worms, however, mirror their product,
ensure that processes to maintain anti-virus protectionsand their make up is determined by the deficiencies in
and to patch regularly will be in place, so as not to voidthe product’s security — security intended to provide
coverage. As coverage becomes more common in theprecisely against the avoided harm. Moreover, those defi-
market, therefore, standards of practice are likely to beciencies present a risk of extraordinarily widespread
clarified, and to become more exacting.harm. In many cases, the manufacturer has the ability to
easily contact the software users by mailing to a database Currently, according to one source, only 11% of
of electronic mail addresses. The manufacturer is in the ‘‘organizations’’ have insurance against cybercrime,
business of monitoring the weaknesses of the product, which might include virus infestations. 98 The potential
providing patches and new versions. Clearly, the risk of scope of damage for computer failures and hacking is
physical harm is such that it is unlikely product liability great enough that such insurance is typically not cost
law should apply, but who can say that liability for negli- effective — its high price reflects the difficulty of quanti-
gence might not follow? Or that, in this new age, courts fying the risk. Increases in security and clarifications of
will not find reasons to expand the reach of product liability risks will permit it to be priced more accurately,
liability law into the ethereal, but altogether costly, realm and potentially increase its uptake.
of cyberspace?
Intellectual Property Next Steps 
It would be interesting to be able to invoke intellec-
he costs of computer infections, the number andtual property laws against worm authors. Admittedly, T size of potential defendants, the industry’s unor-given the plethora of other remedies to which they could
thodox approach to contracting, the increasing role ofbe made subject, this aspect of the rights of the injured
insurance — all these increase the probability that com-might be of only academic interest, but it is an intriguing
puter infections will provoke increasing litigation. Crim-question for the legal scholar. It would appear, on bal-
inal prosecution is straightforward; legislation is in placeance, that if a worm were sufficiently original, there
to penalize worm authors, and it is entirely appropriatewould be no reason in principle why it could not avail
to do so. 99 But questions of civil liability, and the basesitself of the limited protection of copyright laws afforded
for them, are more amorphous.to computer software. Such protection, however, is cur-
tailed where software is expressed in its particular form A cautious approach to sorting out civil obligations
as it is, because of certain types of interface requirements is needed. We cannot wish perfect technology into
it must meet. 93 Since a worm is designed to exploit a being; patience must attend the diligent efforts even of a
particular security flaw, this rule of copyright law would technologically adept behemoth like Microsoft. Liability
significantly limit the scope of permitted protection for for failures of widely installed systems may well dis-
the resulting code. To the extent that authoring tools courage innovators to participate in the market. Con-
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versely, of course, inadequate risk of liability might not sensitive to disruption; tasks once safe on a mid-size or
encourage sufficient diligence. The societal gains of mainframe computer, secure in part because of its dif-
widespread computer access and use emerge in part ferent operating system, also migrate to the desktop. This
from affordability, which, in part, arises from the ability means that vulnerable infrastructure — the infrastruc-
of sellers of computer equipment and services to control ture of corporations and governments and electronic
and understand their liability risks. It might be the case commerce — is no different than that in a hackers’ bed-
that a clearer liability regime would cause resources to be room, greatly facilitating worm attacks.
redirected to installing or creating new security mea-
To make matters worse, irresistible network effectssures, assuming better measures could be made available.
cause users to converge on the same systems, ensuringThe net effect of those security measures — their cost
that not just user groups but whole societies are suscep-less avoided harm — might or might not be economi-
tible to the same weaknesses. This is a process antithet-cally efficient. One thing is sure: perfect security will
ical to an analogous genetic diversity that safeguardsalways be technologically infeasible. Duty must be built
populations by ensuring not all weaknesses are shared byon a basis of reasonable efforts.
individual specimens. Obviously, for now, the marketIt is not easy now to identify least cost avoiders of
has decided to trade off the protection afforded by diver-the harm of worms. If it is ISPs, then legislation
sity, in exchange for focused development efforts andextending some protection to them in the course of
network effects. The more risk averse can take refuge intaking reasonable anti-virus measures would probably be
Apple computers, safer largely because the installed baseneeded.
is small enough that vandals ignore it.
Moreover, it is up to each individual and business to
weigh the risks and rewards of the Internet, and bear The fact is that the enormous number of home and
some of those risks, paying for what best seems to them small business personal computers — the very market
an appropriate level of security. It has been suggested software makers and service providers are trying to reach
that to expose a business to the Internet might itself be — will always be an Achilles heel to the Internet. The
negligent: provisions of service agreements and licences aside, it
‘‘Right now, you have an infrastructure that allows anyone must make sense to encourage a solution to be effected
to connect without standards,’’ he said. ‘‘That creates a by bigger players, because only that will work (if any-
major threat. [Businesses] are exposing services on the thing will). Perhaps operating system manufacturersInternet that have no business being exposed.’’ 100
should be required to bundle anti-virus software, with an
The scale of the installed base of Windows (and, automatic update system that could not be overridden.
perhaps, increasingly of Unix) and its related e-mail cli-
ents both enhances the opportunity for the spread of Otherwise, small users (though not only they) are a
worms and viruses, and greatly magnifies the potential great systemic problem — many points of weakness
for harm. It has recently been suggested that the una- linked to an essential public infrastructure. We can think
voidable risks borne by users of mass-market software of it as not unlike a water utility, the difference being
militate for an enhanced and clarified liability regime for that every user, a huge population reflecting all the
software distributors. 101 Indeed, Microsoft is being sued vagaries of human infirmity and weaknesses of character,
on the basis that the ubiquity of its software presents a has an equal power not only to take water out, but to put
global security risk. The suit is based on an identity theft it in. Historically, this sort of commons has been far
but cites also the Blaster worm. Counsel for the plaintiff better protected by common law than public oversight.
also suggests that Microsoft’s warnings about security The analysis in this short paper points to no clear policy
issues help hackers more than consumers, who are often for major legislative intervention, save for the limited
too slow to install patches — slower than the hackers suggestions set out above. Nor does an optimal rule for
who attack their systems. The case is seeking class action apportioning liability in cases of alleged negligence jump
status. 102 out. The gathering and weighing of evidence in the
Our dependence on networked computers is enor- emerging cases will guide us on the path the law should
mous, and growing. The regular increases in the power follow. The end point of that path, however, is not in
of networked personal computers means that more and doubt. Worms are a major scourge in an essential public
more functions migrate to them. Thus, tasks once per- infrastructure, and law must contribute what it can to
formed manually and discretely are automated, and, so, seeing that they sleep with the fishes.
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